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Background: It is crucial to understand the current status of clinical laboratory practices for 
the largest outbreak of Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus (MERS-CoV) infec-
tions in the Republic of Korea to be well prepared for future emerging infectious diseases.
Methods: We conducted a survey of 49 clinical laboratories in medical institutions and re-
ferral medical laboratories. A short questionnaire to survey clinical laboratory practices re-
lating to MERS-CoV diagnostic testing was sent by email to the directors and clinical pa-
thologists in charge of the clinical laboratories performing MERS-CoV testing. The survey 
focused on testing volume, reporting of results, resources, and laboratory safety.
Results: A total of 40 clinical laboratories responded to the survey. A total of 27,009 
MERS-CoV real-time reverse transcription PCR (rRT-PCR) tests were performed. Most of 
the specimens were sputum (73.5%). The median turnaround time (TAT) was 5.29 hr 
(first and third quartile, 4.11 and 7.48 hr) in 26 medical institutions. The median TAT of 
more than a half of the laboratories (57.7%) was less than 6 hr. Many laboratories were 
able to perform tests throughout the whole week. Laboratory biosafety preparedness in-
cluded class II biosafety cabinets (100%); separated pre-PCR, PCR, and post-PCR rooms 
(88.6%); negative pressure pretreatment rooms (48.6%); and negative pressure sputum 
collection rooms (20.0%).
Conclusions: Clinical laboratories were able to quickly expand their diagnostic capacity in 
response to the 2015 MERS-CoV outbreak. Our results show that clinical laboratories play 
an important role in the maintenance and enhancement of laboratory response in prepa-
ration for future emerging infections.
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INTRODUCTION
On May 20, 2015, Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus 
(MERS-CoV) was confirmed for the first time in an infected pa-
tient in the Republic of Korea. Although the primary case trav-
eled to the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia, the patient 
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did not initially report his recent travel in those countries [1]. This 
case led to transmission of MERS-CoV both within a hospital and 
between hospitals and eventually resulted in the largest outbreak 
of MERS-CoV infections outside the Arabian Peninsula.
At that time, we had limited information on MERS-CoV, and 
only a few clinical laboratories were prepared to perform molec-
ular diagnostic testing for the virus. During the longer than two 
months of the outbreak, 186 confirmed cases were diagnosed 
by real-time reverse transcription PCR (rRT-PCR) of MERS-CoV, 
and specimens from tens of thousands of suspected cases, in-
cluding individuals who contacted the confirmed cases, were 
submitted for this testing. Many clinical laboratories were in-
structed to set up facilities to perform MERS-CoV rRT-PCR on 
site in a short time to fight against the transmission of this virus 
in their own institutes.
An earlier outbreak in 2009 of a novel strain of H1N1 influ-
enza virus A (H1N1 influenza) affected laboratories worldwide, 
with a potentially tremendous impact on the practices of clinical 
laboratories [2]. The outbreak of H1N1 influenza also had a 
great influence in the Republic of Korea. The field of molecular 
testing for pathogens has been expanded in clinical laborato-
ries, and the molecular testing industry has responded quickly 
with the production of new molecular test kits. Numerous stud-
ies, including viral etiology, epidemiology, risk factors, clinical 
and laboratory characteristics, and diagnostic tests, have been 
reported [3]. Despite the fact that clinical laboratory practice 
was a critical element in the response to the H1N1 influenza 
outbreak, there are only a few reports regarding this aspect of 
testing [2, 4, 5].
The ability of clinical laboratories to respond appropriately to 
an outbreak is significant in pathogen control. Therefore, it is 
crucial to understand the current status of clinical laboratories 
in the Republic of Korea in order to be well prepared for any fu-
ture emerging infectious diseases. In this article, we present the 
results of a survey of clinical laboratory practices during the 
2015 MERS-CoV outbreak.
METHODS
The study population consisted of clinical laboratories perform-
ing diagnostic testing for MERS-CoV in medical institutions (hos-
pitals and medical centers) and referral medical laboratories 
among clinical laboratories accredited by the Korean Laboratory 
Accreditation Program [6]. 
This survey was an initiative of the MERS-CoV Laboratory Re-
sponse Task Force of the Korean Society for Laboratory Medi-
cine. We conducted a survey of 49 clinical laboratories. A short 
questionnaire to assess clinical laboratory practices related to 
MERS-CoV diagnostic testing was sent by email to the directors 
and the clinical pathologists (laboratory physicians) in charge of 
the clinical laboratories performing MERS-CoV tests. The survey 
focused on the number of tests and the number of positive test 
results for MERS-CoV, turnaround time (TAT), request process, 
collection and transportation of specimens, testing and report-
ing, communication of results, laboratory safety, and reagents 
and equipment.
RESULTS
A total of 40 clinical laboratories (81.6%, 40/49), including 35 
medical institutions and 5 referral medical laboratories, re-
sponded to the survey. The number of beds in the medical insti-
tutions was as follows: <500 beds, 3 institutions (8.6%); 500-
1,000 beds, 20 (57.1%); and >1,000 beds, 12 (34.3%). All 
clinical laboratories used rRT-PCR as the detection method for 
MERS-CoV.
1. Testing volume and specimen type
The number of MERS-CoV rRT-PCR tests performed was col-
lected from 32 medical institutions and five referral medical lab-
oratories. Data up to July 15, 2015 were collected according to 
the day and specimen type. A total of 27,009 MERS-CoV rRT-
PCR tests were performed at 32 medical institutions (N = 
11,502) and five referral medical laboratories (N=15,507) (Ta-
ble 1 and Fig. 1). The proportion of medical institutions was sig-
nificantly underestimated because one tertiary care hospital 
submitted responses for the survey but not the specimen list, 
and the numbers of MERS-CoV rRT-PCR tests and positive 
specimens at this institution would have been predominant in 
the reporting medical institutions. MERS-CoV rRT-PCR testing at 
all medical institutions and referral medical laboratories in-
creased dramatically in early June (Fig. 1). The number of clini-
cal laboratories that initiated MERS-CoV testing increased in the 
first two to three weeks (Fig. 2). Daily test volumes peaked on 
June 24 (1,088 tests) and began to decrease thereafter (Fig. 1). 
Among the 27,009 MERS-CoV rRT-PCR specimens, 246 (0.9%) 
and 91 (0.3%) specimens were positive and indeterminate, re-
spectively (153 and 71 specimens at medical institutions, 93 
and 20 specimens at referral medical laboratories; Table 1).
Most of the specimens for MERS-CoV rRT-PCR were sputum 
(73.5%). A total of 74.7% of all specimens tested and 82.9% of 
positive specimens were specimens from the lower respiratory 
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tract, such as sputum, bronchoscopy specimens, or tracheal 
aspirates (Table 1). All nasopharyngeal aspirates (N=293) were 
negative for MERS-CoV rRT-PCR.
2. Turnaround time
The TAT is defined as the time from the receipt of specimens in 
the laboratory to the reporting of the results. Unfortunately, 35% 
of the laboratories (nine medical institutions and five referral 
medical laboratories) were not able to provide or analyze data on 
TAT. 
The median TAT was 5.29 hr (first and third quartile, 4.11 
and 7.48 hr) for 26 medical institutions, and the minimum and 
maximum median TAT (first and third quartile) were 4.00 hr 
(3.35 and 5.10 hr) and 26.46 hr (19.59 and 31.36 hr), respec-
Table 1. Number of MERS-CoV tests and positive and indeterminate results according to the specimen type 
Specimen type
Total Medical institution (N=32) Referral medical laboratories (N=5)
N of tests 
(%)
N of positive 
tests (%)
N of 
indeterminate 
tests (%)
N of tests 
(%)
N of positive 
tests (%)
N of 
indeterminate 
tests (%)
N of tests 
(%)
N of positive 
tests (%)
N of 
indeterminate 
tests (%)
Sputum 19,843 (73.5) 178 (0.90) 72 (0.36) 7,304 (63.5) 97 (1.33) 56 (0.77) 12,539 (80.9) 81 (0.65) 16 (0.13)
Bronchoscopy 
   specimens*
202 (0.7) 11 (5.45) 0 (0.0) 69 (0.6) 11 (15.94) 0 (0.0) 133 (0.9) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0)
Tracheal aspirates 138 (0.5) 15 (10.87) 1 (0.72) 135 (1.2) 15 (11.11) 1 (0.74) 3 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0)
Nasopharyngeal 
   aspirates
293 (1.1) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 233 (2.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 60 (0.4) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0)
Nasopharyngeal & 
   oropharyngeal swab
2,240 (8.3) 21 (0.94) 14 (0.63) 1,216 (10.6) 20 (1.64) 13 (0.70) 1,024 (6.6) 1 (0.10) 1 (0.10)
Nasopharyngeal swab 3,150 (11.6) 6 (0.09) 3 (0.10) 2,398 (20.8) 6 (0.25) 0 (0.0) 752 (4.8) 0 (0.0) 3 (0.40)
Oropharyngeal swab 1,075 (4.0) 14 (1.30) 0 (0.0) 79 (0.7) 3 (3.80) 0 (0.0) 996 (6.4) 11 (1.10) 0 (0.0)
Others (stool, blood) 68 (0.3) 1 (1.47) 1 (1.47) 68 (0.6) 1† (1.47) 1‡ (1.47) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0)
Total 27,009 (100.0) 246 (0.91) 91 (0.34) 11,502 (100.0) 153 (1.33) 71 (0.62) 15,507 (100.0) 93 (0.60) 20 (0.13)
*Bronchoscopy specimens include specimens obtained from bronchoalveolar lavage (BAL) and bronchial washing (BW); †Blood; ‡Stool.
Abbreviation: MERS-CoV, Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus.
Fig. 1. Number of Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus (MERS-CoV) tests performed in Korea from May 28 to July 15.  
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tively. The median TAT of more than a half of the laboratories 
(57.7%) was less than 6 hr. The results were reported within 24 
hr in all medical institutions except one (Table 2). 
In the referral medical laboratories, the results were reported 
in less than 6-9 hr (during weekday daytime) or 9-15 hr (during 
weekday nights and weekends).
3. Status of clinical laboratory operation
Table 2 shows the current status of clinical laboratories in medi-
cal institutions with respect to their response to the outbreak of 
MERS-CoV infections. Many laboratories were able to perform 
testing throughout the week (71.4%, 25/35) and ran tests once 
or twice per day. Specimen was collected mainly by clinicians, 
and all specimens were directly transported person-to-person. In 
most cases, clinicians filled out the specimen request informa-
tion form, and doctors of laboratory medicine completed the test 
report form. Most of the MERS-CoV rRT-PCR tests were per-
formed only by clinical laboratory technicians of molecular ge-
netics divisions (74.3% of 35 laboratories). The test results were 
primarily reported by clinical pathologists via electronic process-
ing. Laboratory biosafety preparedness in response to the MERS-
CoV outbreak included class II biosafety cabinets (100%, 35/35); 
separated pre-PCR, PCR, and post-PCR rooms (88.6%, 31/35); 
negative pressure pretreatment rooms (48.6%, 17/35); and neg-
ative pressure sputum collection rooms (20.0%, 7/35).
As shown in Table 3, the current status of clinical laboratories 
in referral medical laboratories was similar to that of medical in-
stitutions in many aspects. Specimens were transported twice 
or three times a day.
4. Pretreatment of specimens, reagents, and equipment
Many laboratories (75%, 30/40) used phosphate-buffered sa-
line for pretreatment of sputum specimens. All reagents for the 
detection of MERS-CoV were components of ready-made kits, 
and the PowerChek MERS Real-time PCR Kit (KogeneBiotech, 
Seoul, Korea) was the most commonly used kit (72.5%, 29/40). 
Most laboratories used CFX96 (Bio-Rad Laboratories, Hercules, 
CA, USA) or ABI7500 or 7800 systems (Life Technologies, Carls-
bad, CA, USA) for rRT-PCR (85.0%, 34/40) (Table 4). 
DISCUSSION
The emergence of novel viral pathogens and the evolution of 
pandemics have presented a new and complex challenge to 
public health care systems at every level [1, 3, 7, 8]. The out-
break of H1N1 influenza eventually turned out to be relatively 
mild, despite the fear it engendered as the potential early stage 
of a pandemic. Breban et al. [9] suggested that MERS-CoV 
does not yet have pandemic potential. Nevertheless a MERS-
CoV outbreak recently occurred in the Republic of Korea, and 
its characteristics were very different from those of the outbreak 
of H1N1 influenza. The MERS-CoV outbreak was more serious 
Fig. 2. Number of clinical laboratories that started Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus (MERS-CoV) testing in Korea from May 28 
to July 15.  
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Table 2. Turnaround time and status of clinical laboratories in medical institutions
(A) Median turnaround time (TAT) for MERS-CoV testing (N=26)
TAT (hr) N %
<6 15 57.7
6-12 8 30.8
12-24 2 7.7
>24 1 3.8
Total 26 100.0
(B) Status of clinical laboratories in medical institutions (N=35)
Survey N %
Specimen request information form input performed by:
   Clinicians 22 62.9
   Doctors of laboratory medicine   2 5.7
   Infection control nurses 1 2.9
   No answer 10 28.6
Test report form input performed by:
   Clinicians 6 17.1
   Doctors of laboratory medicine 11 31.4
   Technologists of laboratory medicine 4 11.4
   Infection control nurses 1 2.9
   Medical technologists or doctors of laboratory medicine 3 8.6
   No answer 10 28.6
Operating days of MERS-CoV test
   Mon-Fri 5 14.3
   Mon-Sat 5 14.3)
   Mon-Sun 25 71.4
Operating hours of MERS-CoV test
   Regular working hours 20 57.1
   Overtime 2 5.7
   24 hr 13 37.1
Number of MERS-CoV tests run per day
   One 16 45.7
   Two 9 25.7
   More than three 5 14.3
   Others* 5 14.3
Specimen collections performed by:
   Clinicians 18 51.4
   Nurses 2 5.7
   Clinicians & nurses 11 31.4
   Clinicians, nurses & medical technologists 1 2.9
   No answer 3 8.6
Survey N %
Specimen transport
   Person-to-person 35 100.0
Laboratory facilities (plural response)
   Negative pressure sputum collection room 7 20.0
   Negative pressure pretreatment room 17 48.6
   Class II biosafety cabinet 35 100.0
   Separated pre-PCR, PCR, and post-PCR rooms 31 88.6
Test performed by:
   Medical technologists of molecular genetics division 26 74.3
   Medical technologists of molecular genetics division 
      & other division
8 22.9
   Medical technologists of molecular genetics division 
      with newly employed technologists for MERS-CoV test
1 2.9
Results reported by:
   Doctors of laboratory medicine – Faculty 29 82.9
   Doctors of laboratory medicine – Fellow 3 8.6
   Doctors of laboratory medicine – Faculty & fellow 2 5.7
   Doctors of laboratory medicine – Faculty, fellow, 
      & resident
1 2.9
Form of the report
   Electronic medical record, group SMS & phone call 2 5.7
   Electronic medical record & group SMS 6 17.1
   Electronic medical record, report paper & phone call 1 2.9
   Electronic medical record & report paper 1 2.9
   Electronic medical record & phone call 5 14.3
   Electronic medical record 20 57.1
*Others, dependent on specimen reception or situation.
Abbreviations: MERS-CoV, Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus; N, Number of medical institutions; SMS, short message service.
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than expected, and numerous problems arose concerning in-
fection control and prevention in hospitals and among the gen-
eral public. 
Because clinical laboratories are usually on the front lines for 
the detection of emerging pathogens, the ability of these labora-
tories to respond to an outbreak is critical for infection control 
and prevention. The elements of clinical laboratory prepared-
ness and responsiveness include availability of personal protec-
Table 3. Status of clinical laboratories in referral medical laborato-
ries (N=5)
Survey N %
Operating days of MERS-CoV tests
   Mon-Sun 5 100.0
Operating hours of MERS-CoV tests
   24 hr 5 100.0
Number of MERS-CoV tests per day
   Two 3 60.0
   Three 1 20.0
   Three on weekdays & two on weekends 1 20.0
Specimen transport
   Transported by:
      Referral medical laboratories themselves 3 60.0
      Commercial transport services 1 20.0
      Both 1 20.0
   With refrigerated system (vehicles) 2 40.0
   With icepack 5 100.0
   Protection for transport agents
      N-95 mask & disposable gloves 4 80.0
      N-95 mask, disposable gloves, & disposable gown 1 20.0
   Number of specimen transportations per day
      Two 2 40.0
      Three 2 40.0
      Three on weekdays & two on weekends 1 20.0
Laboratory facilities (plural response)
   Negative pressure pretreatment room 4 80.0
   Class II biosafety cabinet 5 100.0
   Separated pre-PCR, PCR, and post-PCR rooms 5 100.0
Test performed by:
   Medical technologists of molecular genetics division 3 60.0
   Medical technologists of molecular genetics division 
      & other division
2 40.0
Results reported by:
   Doctors of laboratory medicine-Faculty 5 100.0
Form of report
   Electronic medical records 4 80.0
   Phone call & report paper 1 20.0
Abbreviation: MERS-CoV, Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus.
Table 4. Pretreatment, reagents, and equipment for MERS-CoV 
testing in 2015 outbreak in Korea
Medical 
institutions 
(N=35)
Referral medical 
laboratories 
(N=5)
N % N %
Pretreatment of sputum
   PBS 25 71.4 5 100.0
   NALC 3 8.6
   Commercial lysis kits 2 5.7
   DW 1 2.9
   PBS & NALC 1 2.9
   No pretreatment 1 2.9
   No answer 3 5.7
Reagents
   KogeneBiotech    20 57.1 5 100.0
   SolGent 6 17.1
   Bioneer 4 11.4
   NANOBIOSYS 1 2.9
   KogeneBiotech & Bioneer 1 2.9
   KogeneBiotech & NANOBIOSYS 1 2.9
   KogeneBiotech & Seegene 1 2.9
   KogeneBiotech, SolGent, & NANOBIOSYS 1 2.9
Equipment
   BIO-RAD CFX96 15 42.9 1 20.0
   ABI7500 or 7500 Fast 11 31.4 4 80.0
   Bioneer Exicycler 4 11.4
   LG SLAN 1 2.9
   NANOBIOSYS G2-4 1 2.9
   BIO-RAD CFX96 & Bioneer Exicycler 1 2.9
   BIO-RAD CFX96, ABI7500 or 7800 
      & NANOBIOSYS G2-4   
1 2.9
   No answer 1 2.9
Abbreviations: MERS-CoV, Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus; 
PBS, phosphate–buffered saline; NALC, N-acetyl L-cysteine; DW, deionized 
water; KogeneBiotech, KogeneBiotech PowerChek MERS-CoV real-time 
PCR kit; SolGent, SolGent DiaPlexQ MERS-CoV virus detection kit; Bioneer, 
Bioneer AccuPower MERS-CoV real-time RT-PCR kit; NANOBIOSYS, 
NANOBIOSYS MERS-CoV corona virus detection kit; BIO-RAD CFX96, BIO-
RAD CFX96 real-time PCR system; ABI7500 or 7500 Fast, Life Technolo-
gies ABI7500 or 7800 real-time PCR system; Bioneer Exicycler, Bioneer Exi-
cycler 96 real-time PCR system; LG SLAN, LG Life Sciences SLAN real-time 
PCR system; NANOBIOSYS G2-4, NANOBIOSYS real-time PCR G2-4. 
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tive equipment and its appropriate use, availability and use of 
appropriate testing supplies, adequacy of staffing, and infra-
structure requirements including laboratory space [2]. In 2012 
and 2013, the European Centre for Disease Prevention and 
Control (ECDC) and the WHO Regional Office for Europe con-
ducted a joint survey [10]. Although the number of countries 
that had laboratory capabilities to detect and confirm MERS-
CoV increased in 2013 (55.8%, 29 of 52 countries) compared 
with 2012 (47.8%, 22 of 46 countries), a half of the countries 
were still unable to test MERS-CoV [10]. 
The present study reveals a snapshot of the current status 
and capability of clinical laboratories to respond to the MERS-
CoV outbreak in the Republic of Korea. Most clinical laboratories 
participating in the survey were considered to have sufficient 
capacity to respond to the outbreak. Immediately after the 
MERS-CoV rRT-PCR test was approved, many laboratories were 
able to perform testing seven days a week and the number of 
tests reported increased dramatically. The median TAT of more 
than a half of the laboratories (57.7%) was shorter than 6 hr, 
and the minimum median TAT was 4.00 hr. The results were re-
ported within 24 hr in all medical institutions except one. One 
limitation of our study is that even though we obtained re-
sponses from the majority of medical institutions and referral 
medical laboratories, the results may not be fully representative 
for a number of reasons. Data were collected before the end of 
the MERS-CoV outbreak and did not include some major medi-
cal institutions and public health laboratories such as the Korea 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. In addition, our re-
sults report the number of MERS-CoV rRT-PCR tests, and not 
the number of MERS-CoV cases.
Previously, Sousa et al. [11] suggested that the use of upper 
respiratory specimens (e.g., nasopharyngeal swabs) for MERS-
CoV diagnosis might not be as sensitive as the use of lower re-
spiratory tract specimens. The laboratory diagnostic guidelines 
for MERS-CoV testing of the Korean Society for Laboratory Medi-
cine recommended using specimens from the lower respiratory 
tract. In the present survey, the number of positive results from 
MERS-CoV rRT-PCR was significantly higher in specimens ob-
tained from the lower respiratory tract (1.01%, 204/20,183) 
compared with specimens from the upper respiratory tract 
(0.6%, 41/6,785) (P =0.002, chi-square test). Therefore, the 
specimen type is expected to have a significant impact on diag-
nostic sensitivity and should be considered when testing emerg-
ing pathogens.
For laboratory biosafety in response to the MERS-CoV out-
break, class II biosafety cabinets were adequately supplied but 
high-end engineering facilities such as negative pressure spu-
tum collection and pretreatment rooms were not readily avail-
able. However, no laboratory-acquired infections were reported 
during the outbreak, thus standard precautions with droplet 
precautions appeared to be sufficient for the prevention of labo-
ratory-acquired infection of MERS-CoV. Nonetheless, improve-
ments in engineering laboratory biosafety are needed for pre-
paredness to test agents with a higher biosafety level.
Clinical laboratories have the primary responsibility for testing 
specimens to support clinical decision-making. Although public 
health laboratories also test specimens to aid clinical decisions, 
their roles in surveillance, strain identification, and tracking of 
drug resistance are arguably their main priorities [12]. Moreover, 
clinical laboratories often have resources available that allow for 
rapid expansion [12]. In conclusion, the results of this survey 
contribute to the comprehensive view of clinical laboratory re-
sponse in the Republic of Korea to the recent outbreak of 2015 
MERS-CoV. On the basis of currently available data, clinical labo-
ratories in Korea were able to expand their diagnostic capacity in 
a short time and achieve a TAT of shorter than nine hours with 
testing seven days per week to response to the recent MERS-
CoV outbreak, although the delay in the early period of the out-
break should be improved. Therefore, clinical laboratories should 
be ready for the maintenance and enhancement of laboratory 
responses in preparation for future emerging infections.
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